Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility
and Voluntary Responsibility
John R. Silber

The debt owed H. L. A. Hart by lawyers and philosophers and by the
general public through them grows exponentially, it seems, with
every stroke of his active pen. Particularly outstanding contributions
to contemporary thought are Hart's extensive writings on the highly
complex relationship between morality and law, on his discussions of
moral and legal responsibility, and on the proper role of mens rea
in determining who should be punished. Hart writes, for example,
that: "[I]n a civilized [legal] system only those who could have kept
the law should be punished," and that the "individual ... has a right

not to be [punished] unless he could have avoided doing what he
did."' In presenting these views Hart speaks for most moral philosophers no less than for the majority of the legal profession. Contemporary minds seem to be united in their rejection of any theory of responsibility that depends upon a notion of status responsibility2 -- a view
which permits of finding men morally wrong and blameworthy for
their diseased condition or state of being in the absence of any morally
blameworthy conduct that might have been avoided. The legal definition of criminal conduct and the contemporary philosophical view of
moral obligation are based on the concept of voluntary responsibility,
according to which man is morally wrong and blameworthy, not for
what he is, but for what he does or is able to avoid doing.
Although the conceptions of status and voluntary responsibility are
both enshrined in mythological lore (the former, for instance, in the
fall of Adam and the doctrine of original sin, and the latter in the
revolt of Prometheus), it is a curious and important historical fact
that the conception of voluntary responsibility has become dominant
in both ethics and criminal law, while the conception of status responsibility has scarcely survived. While one has been commended
John R. Silber is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy and the Program of
Comparative Studies and is Professor of Arts and Letters at the University of Texas.
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for its advance beyond primitive notions, the other has been condemned as primitive and rejected, as Hart argues, on the grounds

that it is itself an immoral notion. And if status responsibility has not
been totally rejected by criminal courts, lawyers and legal theorists,
it is accepted into criminal law only under severe limitations, with
grave doubts over strong opposition, and for extra-moral political and
social considerations.
Following a very brief survey of law and ethics to introduce some
empirical support for these observations, I shall try to show that while
neither the voluntary nor the status conception of responsibility is
satisfactory by itself, both are required with modifications in the
formulation of a sound theory of responsibility. I shall argue that
recent tort law provides useful guidelines for the extension of the
concept of mens rea and for the development of a concept of responsibility that gives proper place to status elements. And throughout the
paper, I shall use-either as a guide or a counter-Hart's concise statement of the essentially voluntary character of moral responsibility in
ascertaining the role and scope of voluntary elements of awareness,
intention, choice and control in human action. Although some of my
disagreements with Hart are fundamental, most involve differences
of emphasis or degree, and all have developed out of periods of informative struggle with his ideas.
I
In common law countries it is taken for granted that no man should
be treated as a criminal or convicted of a crime unless he has done
something wrong and knew what he was doing. Generally speaking,
the behavior of a man is to be treated as criminal conduct only if there
is a concurrence of mens rea, the awareness of the wrongfulness or
unlawfulness of the conduct, and actus reus, the physical manifestation of mens rea.8 With rare exceptions, no act or occurrence can be
criminal unless the basic functions of intelligence and volition are
present. The consensus of legal thinking on this point is well summarized by Professor Herbert Packer:
To punish conduct without reference to the actor's state of
mind is both inefficacious and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an awareness of the factors
making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs
to be subjected to punishment in order to deter him or others
from behaving similarly in the future, nor does it single him
out as a socially dangerous individual who needs to be in3 J. HALL, GENmAL

mRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 70, 179, 250, 251 (2d ed. 1960).
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capacitated or reformed. It is unjust because the actor is
subjected to the stigma of a criminal conviction without
being morally blameworthy.4
Generally speaking criminal sanctions are to be applied only in
those situations in which moral blame would be appropriate. If criminal punishment is understood, in the words of Professor H. M. Hart,
as "a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community," 5 then we can more easily understand and accept
the moral indignation and high-pitched rhetoric of the district attorney as an expression of the lawyer's professional sense of the dependence of criminal law on morality. And unless morality makes
provision for status offenses and status responsibility, we should find
in criminal law a tendency to deny legal force to status crimes or status
reponsibility.
Morality, as interpreted by most contemporary philosophers, makes
no such provisions. H. L. A. Hart, in complete argreement with Kant,
lists among the distinctive features of morality the "voluntary character of moral offenses." 6 In developing this point, Hart writes:
If a person whose action, judged ab extra, has offended against
moral rules or principles, succeeds in establishing that he did
this unintentionally and in spite of every precaution that it
was possible for him to take, he is excused from moral responsibility, and to blame him in these circumstances would
itself be considered morally objectionable. Moral blame is
therefore excluded because he has done all that he can
do.... [I]n morals "I could not help it" is always an excuse,
and moral obligation would be altogether different from
what it is if the moral "ought" did not in this sense imply
In due course I shall examine Hart's statement in detail. For the
moment, however, I enter it in the record as a clear statement of the
generally accepted view of the essentially voluntary character of moral
responsibility-a character which makes lawyers properly reluctant
to apply criminal sanctions in a situation unless there is an action
that is voluntary and intentional. Lawyers would be prone, moreover, to excuse any action that is unintentional, undertaken with due
care and precaution, or unavoidable.
4 Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 109; cf. MODEs.
PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
5 H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
6 H.LA. HRT, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 173 (1961).

T Id. at 173-74 (1961).
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This is illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California.8 Robinson was convicted under a California statute
which made narcotics addiction a criminal offense. Under the terms
of the statute: "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or
be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by
or under the direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe
and administer narcotics." 9 During Robinson's trial, the judge instructed the jury that this statute made it an offense for a person
"either to use narcotics, or to be addicted to the use of narcotics."
The judge said further: "That portion of the statute referring to the
'use' of narcotics is based upon the 'act' of using. That portion of the
statute referring to 'addicted to the use' of narcotics is based on a
condition or status. They are not identical .

. . ."10

It was therefore

unclear to the Supreme Court whether the jury found Robinson
guilty of the act or merely the status condemned by the statute. In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stewart complained that
the statute is not one "which punishes a person for the use of narcotics,
for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly
behavior resulting from their administration." Rather, he said: "We
deal with a statute which makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense .... California has said that a person can be continuously guilty of this offense whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State, and whether or not he has been
guilty of any antisocial behavior there."".
In order to categorize this statute properly, Justice Stewart considered whether it would be possible to "make it a criminal offense
for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
venereal disease ....

[I]n the light of contemporary human knowl-

edge," he concluded, "a law which made a criminal offense of such a
disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment... ."12 He concluded that the statute
under which Robinson was convicted fell into this same category because drug addiction is an illness, and that a law which "imprisons
a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched
any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular
behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment. . .

."

The

length of imprisonment was held to be irrelevant. Justice Stewart
8 370 U.S. 660, rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962).
9 CAL. HEALTir & SArETY CoDE § 11721.

10 370 US. at 662.
11 Id. at 666.
12 Id.
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declared: "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."1 3
Justice Douglas, concurring, compared narcotic addiction to insanity. He noted that while insane people "may be confined either
for treatment or for the protection of society, they are not branded
as criminals."' 4 And he concluded:
I do not see how under our system being an addict can be
punished as a crime. If addicts can be punished for their
addiction, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. Each has a disease and each must be treated as a sick
person.... He [the addict] may, of course, be confined for
treatment for the protection of society. Cruel and unusual
punishment results not from the confinement, but from convicting an addict of a crime.... A prosecution for addiction,
with its resulting stigma and irreparable damage to the good
name of the accused, cannot be justified as a means of protecting Society, where a civil commitment would do as
well.' 5
The opinions in Robinson v. California illustrate the abhorrence
lawyers generally feel for status responsibility in criminal law and
their refusal to use this concept in defining crime. The opinions reflect their confidence in and approval of the dominant concept of
moral obligation which allows only for voluntary responsibility according to which only action or conduct (actus reus) that is voluntary
and intentional (involving mens rea) can be morally blameworthy.
Conditions of moral blameworthiness as defined by the voluntary
conception of responsibility are accepted in Robinson v. California
as limiting conditions for the application of criminal sanctions. The
moral inappropriateness of blaming one for what he is rather than for
what he does, indeed, the immorality of status responsibility, is seen
to be the driving force behind the Court's decision.' 6
13 Id. at 667.
14 Id. at 669.
15 Id. at 674, 676, 677 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, did not agree that narcotics addiction is an illness nor,
consequently, that to subject narcotic addicts to criminal sanctions would amount to cruel
and unusual punishment. But, like Justices Stewart and Douglas, he denied the right of
the state to convict a person for his addiction to narcotics rather than for their use. Since,
according to Justice Harlan, addiction is not more than "a compelling propensity to use
narcotics," 370 U.S. at 679, he reasoned that the California court had in effect authorized
"criminal punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act." Id. And he refused to
permit the substitution of a wish following from status for an action, an actus reus, in the
definition of a crime.
16 But the reluctance of our courts to use the concept of status responsibility in crim-
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It might seem, however, that a serious and extensive reliance on the
concept of status responsibility in criminal law is found in those cases
in which a person may be convicted of a crime and suffer criminal
sanctions on the basis of strict liability. Many laws concerned with
public welfare-e.g., laws pertaining to food adulteration or mislabeling of drugs-permit criminal conviction in cases where there
is complete absence of mens rea and even absence of actus reus by the
accused. 17 But even this is not a serious exception to my general point
about the criminal law's avoidance of status responsibility, for the
criminal law is nowhere under more vigorous or sustained attack both
from within, in actual litigation, and from without, in legal scholarship, than in its reliance on strict liability.18
Even so it must be acknowledged that there is an increasing reliance
on strict liability in tort law, particularly in cases involving the determination of responsibility for defective products, and this developinal cases has not been universal. Many states using the common law have applied criminal
sanctions to the offense of vagrancy. Prior to Robinson v. California, a vagrant could be
anyone from a healthy beggar, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 437 (1958), to a prostitute, TX. PEN.
CODE art. 607 (1952), to a narcotics user, N.J. Rnv. STAT. § 2A:170-78 (1953) ("disorderly
person"); see Dubin & Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.
102, 109-13 (1962) (exhaustive list of categories). It is dear that such laws punish a state of
being or a condition and abandon the requirement of conduct, actus reus, in the definition
of the criminal offense. Confinement for vagrancy is a punishment, in the words of Justice

Holmes, for "being a certain kind of person, not [for] doing a certain overt act .... [I]t
follows ... that.., the conduct proved is not the offense but only a ground of inference."
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 179 Mass. 533, 534, 61 N.E. 213, 214 (1901) (emphasis supplied).
Not only Robinson v. Californiastands in opposition to crimes of status; this opposition
is also found in the Model Penal Code and in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.
17 In United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), the Supreme Court recognized
the validity of a law which, in the words of the Court, "dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing." Id. at 281. Here the
Court upheld the criminal conviction of Dotterweich, president of a company that had
made two interstate shipments of drugs that were. either mislabeled or adulterated,
although it had not been shown that Dotterweich was either personally aware of the
mistaken shipments or negligent in his administration of the company. In United States v.
Balint, 258 US. 250 (1922), and United States v. Behrman, 258 US. 280 (1922), the Supreme
Court construed the Harrison Narcotics Act to mean that knowledge that one was selling
narcotics was not an element in the offense of selling them. The Court raised no objection
to the provision of the five years' imprisonment as the maximum penalty under the statute
for an offense which could be proved against a person who did not knowingly engage in
the activity proscribed by the statute. (It should be noted that the issue of imprisonment
was not raised on appeal by the parties in Balint.)
18 See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIMINAL LAw 342-51, 375 (2d ed. 1960);
H.L.A. HART, Tim CONCEPT OF LAW 168-69, 173-75 (1961); G. WiiLIAMs, CRIMINAL LAw
§§ 70-76, 81 (1953); H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
401, 422-25 (1958); Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107,
109-10, 147-48; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L. REV. 55 (1933); Wasserstrom,
Strict Liability in the CriminalLaw, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 731 (1960); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05
and Comment at 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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ment has not brought shrill objection from legal scholars. But here
again I find no more than a highly qualified exception to my descriptive point about the rejection of status responsibility in criminal law.
In the first place, tort law is a branch of civil, not criminal law: the
defendant in a tort action is neither indicted by a grand jury of fellow
citizens nor accused of a crime and prosecuted by a public official. And
most important, he is not subject to a criminal sanction of fine or imprisonment; a judgment against him does not ipso facto imply an
assumption of his moral blameworthiness or the stigma of criminal
conviction. 19 In the second place, the courts have justified their reliance on strict liability in tort actions either on the principle of overriding public welfare, or on grounds which reveal varying degrees of
personal responsibility by tortfeasors even though, admittedly, the
degrees would be insufficient to sustain the ascription of personal
responsibility on the basis of the voluntary conception of responsibility.
To illustrate, in Suvada v. White Motor Company,20 we find the
court saying:
Recognizing that public policy is the primary factor for imposing strict liability on the seller and manufacturer of food
in favor of the injured consumer, we come to the crucial
question in this case, namely, is there any reason for imposing strict liability in food cases and liability based on
negligence in cases involving products other than food ...
Without extended discussion, it seems obvious [a] that public
interest in human life and health, [b] the invitations and
solicitations to purchase the product and [c] the justice of
imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping
the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving
motor vehicles and other products, where their defective
condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user,
21
as they are in food cases.
In this opinion there is no suggestion that moral blameworthiness
attaches to the defendant. The court speaks of "imposing the loss" not
of "imposing the blame" or "imposing the penalty." In [a] the court
stresses merely the important public concern that products which are
advertised and sold be safe for public use. In [b] and [c] the court
19 This is not to deny that some acts that give rise to tort litigation do involve the
moral blameworthiness of the agent.
20 32 II. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
21 Id. at 618-19, 210 N.E.2d at 186 (brackets inserted). I wish here to thank Professor
Wayne Thode of the University of Texas School of Law for informing me of the extensive
use of strict liability in tort law, and for his general criticisms of this paper.
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points out that the party who creates the risk (whether by manufacture,
advertising, sale, etc.) and reaps the profit is in justice the one to bear
whatever loss may be incurred if such products are defective. Here the
court recognizes responsibility for a loss even though the loss is not the
consequence of a voluntary, intentional act. The manufacturer or seller
of a defective product is responsible for the loss, not because voluntarily or through negligence he occasioned the loss, but because he is
the one who shaped the situation in which the loss might occur. The
status of the manufacturer or seller rather than a specific act of his
provides the basis of his responsibility; and yet the manufacturer or
seller creates his status through prior acts even though those acts have
nothing directly to do with the loss. This is, then, a model of responsibility which does not fit the model of either voluntary or status responsibility, but rather suggests a conception of responsibility containing
elements of both. This model should commend itself to the attention of
philosophers and criminal lawyers for having at least some of the
subtlety and complexity characteristic of human life.
It will be seen, I believe, that this conception of responsibility in tort
law is appropriate for the concept of human action which I wish to
support. But it cannot be regarded as a qualification of my basic point
that in both criminal law and contemporary ethics there has been,
generally, a rejection of status responsibility and an assumption of the
validity and adequacy of the voluntary conception.
II
Thus far we have merely observed the rejection of the concept of
status responsibility in criminal law, as represented by the Supreme
Court, and in morality, as articulated by H. L. A. Hart. But whether
this concept has theoretical or practical advantages of its own has not
been considered; nor has the conceptual or practical adequacy in law
and morality of the prevailing concept of voluntary responsibility
been critically assessed. So far we have accepted passively the view of
the many that the concept of status responsibility-because it conflicts with the voluntary conception-is immoral and should be rejected. But Plato has warned us about the views of the many.
If we probe beneath the surface we shall discover, I think, (1) that
moral and criminal offenses cannot be understood either as voluntary
actions devoid of status or as states of being devoid of intentional
activity; (2) that neither status nor voluntary responsibility is adequate
in law or in ethics; that both are high abstractions defying sensible
application in either field; (3) that human action, which cannot possi-
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bly be understood either as pure status (being) or pure voluntary
intentionality (doing), is the complex, active being of living persons
who function at various points on a continuum of action-a continuum that approaches vanishing points at the opposite extremes of
pure being and pure doing; (4) that the continuum of human action is
divisible into, or can be ordered in terms of, actions of distinctive
types whose properties are functions of the proportion of status and
voluntary elements; (5) that a sound concept of responsibility must be
so fitted to the continuum of action over which it applies that it can
designate the modes of response available to and/or obligatory for
persons functioning at any particular point on that continuum.
Nothing less than an entire theory of human action and responsibility
could establish all these points. In the rest of this paper I shall confine
myself (a) to showing some of the perplexities that arise when one tries
to understand certain moral experiences in terms either of the doctrine of the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California,or that of Hart;
(b) to the partial analysis of Hart's paradigmatic statement of the
character of moral offenses and moral obligation; and (c) to suggesting
the value and power both for law and ethics of a concept of responsibility containing both status and voluntary elements.
A.
If we take a more careful and critical look at the work of the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California,we find apparent in the Court's
decision the practical absurdity of trying to separate~the being and the
doing of human agents-an effort required by the distinction between
status and voluntary responsibility. The Court agreed that the California statute under which Robinson was convicted would have been
valid had it required proof of the actual use of narcotics within the
state's jurisdiction. Yet if the Court was correct in defining narcotics
addiction as a disease, and if one characteristic of this disease is the
compulsive use of narcotics, it is difficult to understand how a statute
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment by holding one responsible for
having the disease, whereas the punishment would not be cruel or
unusual if it were applied to those acts which are the inevitable consequences of the disease. To use the example of the court, if "even one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime'
of having a common cold," why would the punishment be any less
cruel or unusual if it were for the "crime" of having sneezed, coughed,
or blown one's nose?
The Court was obviously on absurd ground philosophically when it
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tried to separate acts of addiction from the status of addiction. If the
Court was right in holding that addiction implies use and that use is
criminal, how could it deny that addiction is criminal? But if addiction is not criminal, then it would seem to follow logically either that
addiction does not imply use or that use is not criminal. 22
The Court could have avoided this absurdity by boldly asserting
that because the status or condition of addiction and the use of narcotics are inseparable, the condition-and-use together are the disease,
and that therefore neither the state of addiction nor the use of
narcotics can be punished as a crime. 23 The Court was reluctant to
take this step for many reasons. Paramount among them is the fact
that the Court would have had to blur the distinction between the
condition or state of being of the accused and the actions of the
accused. This blurring would, in turn, destroy the traditionally accepted "factual" basis for the distinction between voluntary and status
responsibility.
The refusal of the Court to take this step is not entirely regrettable.
There may be important uses for the fiction of pure actus reus and
voluntary responsibility, despite their philosophical limitations. Indeed, it is one of the beauties of the law-sufficient perhaps to revive
the lost faith in a Divine Order-that the Supreme Court can serve the
interests of philosophers while making serious philosophical mistakes.
However impossible it may be to separate the use of narcotics from the
status of addiction, it is quite clear that we do not want the police
arresting citizens in the absence of any antisocial behavior. Political
liberty was served by the decision in Robinson, despite the fact that
the decision reveals the artificiality and absurdity of sharply distinguishing action from being, or voluntary from status responsibility.
22

Mr. Justice Harlan, as previously observed in note 15 supra, avoided this pitfall in his

concurring opinion.
23 This appears to be the direction taken by the circuit court in Driver v. Hinnant, 356
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). The court held that the constitutional provision against cruel
and unusual punishment precluded North Carolina's punishing a chronic alcoholic for
public drunkenness. In language reminiscent of Robinson v. California, the court said:
"The upshot of our decision is that the State cannot stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease."
356 F.2d at 765. "The alcoholic's presence is not his act, for he did not will it. It may be
likened to the movements of an imbecile or a person in a delirium of a fever." Id. at 764.
See also Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which the circuit
court recognized chronic alcoholism as a defense to the charge of public intoxication.
Future developments may be presaged in the dissent of Mr. Justice Fortas to the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Budd v. California, 385 U.S. 909, 912-13 (1966):
"Our morality does not permit us to punish for illness. We do not impose punishment
for involuntary conduct, whether the lack of volition results from 'insanity,' addiction to
narcotics, or from other illnesses. The use of the crude and formidable weapon of criminal
punishment on the alcoholic is neither seemly nor sensible, neither purposeful nor civilized."
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B.
If we turn to an examination of the philosophical doctrine of voluntary responsibility as presented in Hart's paradigmatic statement, there
are many points to be considered. One remarkable feature of Hart's
characterization of moral offenses and moral responsibility is that he
restricts himself to a pejorative context, to a context of moral failure.
Hart's characterization of the distinctive features of morality in terms
of moral offenses might be explained by the fact that the description
is given in the context of a discussion of the similarities and differences
of law and morality. There is very little in the rules of law or ethics
concerning obligations to praise others or the right to claim praise for
ourselves. The rules of law and morality derive their importance from
the fact that they are so often transgressed; hence, most of the thought
and ingenuity expended in these fields has of necessity been directed
to the recognition, evaluation, and just handling of transgressions. We
no more need to praise the morally virtuous than to pin medals on
those who have kept out of jail. The norms of ethics and law define a
high level of expectation. In law they are occasionally exceeded, but
only in those moral systems providing for supererogation is there even
a logical possibility of exceeding ethical norms.
But these considerations do not, in my opinion, account adequately
for the negative character of Hart's exposition. Hart's selection of the
pejorative context derives, I believe, both from his view of morality
and from his idiosyncratic, if not dogmatic, linguistic restriction of the
term "responsibility" to situations of failure.
Hart's view of morality is essentially rule oriented. He discusses
moral offense only as action that offends against moral rules or principles. If the possibility of moral offense or moral achievement is restricted to the compliance with or transgression of moral rules or
principles without regard to the fulfillment or loss of moral values,
moral achievement will at best be the neutral absence of moral offense.
In this particular context we cannot expect Hart to say everything
about ethics, and perhaps he would wish to supplement his account
of morality with a discussion of values. But recent English and American ethical thought has been so dominated by the discussion of rules
and their many kinds that I doubt it. This is rather a bias in contemporary English and American ethical discussion that needs correction by a channel crossing and an extended vacation on the Continent.
Hart's restriction of "responsibility" to contexts of failure would
preclude, for example, our substitution of a context of moral achievement and compliance for his context of moral failure and offense, although there is nothing about the English language (or any other
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language) that prevents it. Suppose we use most of Hart's own words
to describe an action which has not offended but has accorded perfectly
with moral rules or principles. Consider the following:
If a person whose action, judged ab extra, has been in complete accord with [has offended against] moral rules or principles, succeeds in establishing that he did this unintentionally
and in spite of every precaution that it was possible for him
to take, he is denied [excused from] moral responsibility, and
to praise [blame] him in these circumstances would itself be
considered morally objectionable. Moral praise [blame] is
therefore excluded because he has had too little or nothing
to do with it [done all that he could do].
We may continue:
[I]n morals "I didn't really do anything" ["I could not help
it"] is always a reasonable disclaimer [an excuse], and moral
obligation would be altogether different from what it is if the
moral achievement ["ought"] did not in this sense imply
performance ["can"]. 24
Hart would surely object to the substitutions; he would never countenance my speaking of responsibility for a morally or legally exemplary act. Yet there is nothing odd about this usage. A morally
good person would immediately object to being credited with responsibility for an apparently exemplary act which he performed
either inadvertently or not at all; he might likewise feel some disappointment if another person were credited with responsibility for an
exemplary act which he had in fact performed and for which he was
in fact responsible. This is perfectly intelligible talk, and not unheard
of. We also find the honorific use of "responsibility" in such statements
as the following: "He is a thoroughly responsible person," or "he was
responsible for saving the child's life," or "he deserves no credit since
he was not responsible for it." There is nothing odd about these statements, but let us suppose there were. What has one proved if he
establishes that a given usage is odd besides its oddness? Surely "odd"
does not imply "wrong" or "mistaken." Nor could the fact of linguistic
oddness, if it were a fact, offset the most important nonverbal fact
about responsibility, namely, that personal involvement provides the
basis for responsibility whether in contexts of success or failure. Hence
we have the right to use the word "responsibility" when there is personal involvement whether it be praiseworthy or blameworthy. 25
24 This is the same passage quoted at note 7 supra. Hart's original phrases are inserted

in brackets following my italicized alterations.
25 The relevance of this discussion should be apparent in due course. If responsibility
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With these preliminary observations out of the way, let us now
consider Hart's discussion of the voluntary character of moral offenses
point by point, beginning with the first sentence:
If a person whose action, judged ab extra, has offended
against moral rules or principles, succeeds in establishing that
he did this unintentionally and in spite of every precaution
that it was possible for him to take, he is excused from moral
responsibility ....
I find two ambiguities in this sentence which are not apparent or
troublesome if one accepts dominant contemporary views about intention and action. For example, does "did this" refer to an action performed unintentionally by a person, or does Hart hold that all action
involves intention? If he holds that in every action the agent must have
an intention, it follows that "did this" cannot refer to an action but
only to an event which, judged ab extra, might have appeared to be an
action. I assume that Hart accepts the dominant view that intention is
an essential ingredient in action; hence that there could be no action
which was not intended. But whether Hart takes the broad or the
narrow view of action-i.e., whether "did this" refers to an action or
merely to an event-is of no great importance in this context, because
Hart clearly insists that moral offenses are voluntary and that actions
or events (whichever word is appropriate) neither intended nor the
result of negligence are not voluntary and therefore are excusable.
Consequently the undetermined scope of the term "action" results
only in an unimportant vagueness so far as this passage is concerned.
There is a vagueness or ambiguity in the word "intention," however,
which is of critical importance. Does Hart restrict the meaning of intention to that which is consciously intended, or would he accept the
view that there are subconscious, unconscious, and organic modes of
intention in addition to the conscious modes in their varying degrees
of focus and intensity? By means of an examination of this passage
alone there is no way to determine which alternative Hart accepts. It
can be seen, nevertheless, that these alternatives confront Hart as a
dilemma: the consequences of either option are inimical to his position, and support the view of action and responsibility which I wish to
urge. If Hart accepts the narrow conception of intention, he must
sacrifice factual support for his position; if he accepts the broader
conception of intention, he must blur the distinction between volunis limited to pejorative contexts, it will be difficult if not impossible to present in ordinary

English a continuum theory of responsibility in which voluntary and status elements are
combined. The increased difficulty would be, moreover, the gratuitous consequence of
linguistic dogmatism.
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tary and involuntary to the point that moral offenses cannot be accurately designated by their distinctive voluntary character.
If we take the latter alternative and recognize varying degrees and
kinds of intentionality, we recognize our personal involvement to
varying degrees in complex series of events. This recognition involves
our acceptance of the sequence as our action even though we may not
have fully or even consciously intended it. On this view, we preserve
the essentially intentional 26 character of all action while recognizing
the degrees of action corresponding to the degrees and kinds of intentionality and personal involvement. This position, which I take,
is more adequately supported by the few relevant facts available than
the former alternative, which restricts intention to consciousness. But
Hart cannot approve this latter alternative along with its factual support without destroying his thesis that moral offenses are essentially
voluntary. For if we admit that personal involvement in action need
not be accompanied by conscious intent in order for the action to be
morally imputed to the person as agent, we destroy the basis for any
sharp distinction between that which is and is not voluntary, thereby
destroying the foundation for any sharp distinction between voluntary
and status responsibility, and we alter radically the conditions or
criteria of moral excusability. It is, then, clearly impossible to speak
accurately or precisely of the essentially voluntary character of moral
offenses.

27

I presume, therefore, that Hart accepts the former alternative and
restricts intention to that which is consciously intended. He holds, I
believe, that a person succeeds in establishing that he did X unintentionally, if he can show that he did not consciously intend to do X. But
what justification can Hart offer for restricting the meaning of intention to conscious intention-for assuming, that is, that there is no
such thing as subconscious or unconscious intention? Perhaps he would
rely on Stuart Hampshire's argument that: "The sleeping and unconscious man is not an agent ....

It is a necessary truth that he has

no intention under these conditions.12 8 It would seem that Freud's
demonstration of censorship in dreams and, indeed, the manifest con26 Here, of course, "intentional" has a common sense and not a phenomenological, technical meaning.
27 I shall consider later the question of whether the acceptance of this view alters the
relation of implication between "ought" and "can" in such a way that, as Hart alleges,
moral obligation would be transformed into something altogether different from what it is.
28 S. HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACMiON 94 (1959). Consider also Hampshire's statement:
"A more decisive difference between consciousness and unconsciousness lies between the
necessity of intended action in the one case and the mere natural movement without
intention in the other." Id. When done by linguistic fiat, as in this instance, philosophy
becomes as easy as it is irrelevant.
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tent of dreams apart from any Freudian interpretation, force us to
recognize the intentions of the dreamer; his personal involvement
seems to color everything. Yet, like many American and English philosophers who ignore Kant's adage that concepts without percepts are
empty, Hart perhaps assumes that the logic of language will supply
our want of information. By restricting the meaning of intention to
conscious intention and the meaning of voluntary action to that which
is done intentionally, Hart can preserve the sharp distinction between
voluntary and involuntary and, thereby, the basis for his insistence on
the voluntary character of moral offenses. His theory gains clarity,
precision, and some coherence by this move to linguistic rationalism,
but it loses its factual support and plausibility.
I do not reject Hart and Hampshire's restriction of the meaning of
intention to conscious intention on the basis of my intuition of the
"logic" of the term "intention" or on the basis of my "right" to replace
their definition with one of my own. I urge, rather, that there are
relevant facts about human action which are denied when one insists
that a person has to be conscious of what he intends in order to have an
intention. Just as the anatomy and organic functions of the whale force
us to admit that a whale is not a fish, regardless of the logic of the term
"fish" or the definitions of venerable dictionaries, the anatomy and
dynamics of human behavior and action force us to recognize unconscious and subconscious, no less than conscious, intentions.
Factual support for the broader conception of intention, and for
the theoretical implications regarding responsibility that follow from
it, is found in abundance in the daily affairs of ourselves, other individuals, and nations. How am I to regard those movements of mine
which are judged by others, ab extra, to be my actions and which may
reveal to others one or more of my overriding, long range intentions,
but which I can truthfully report were not a part of my conscious
intention at the time my movements took place? Consider the way,
for example, men and nations pick fights and exacerbate quarrels to
their enormous advantage while truthfully and conscientiously denying
all conscious intent or desire to fight. Consider Oedipus' attack on
Creon; did he really believe that Creon was guilty or was this just the
sort of conduct to which Oedipus was habituated? Consider Odysseus'
trifling, yet possibly sincere, excuses for failing to support Hecuba in
Euripides' play; what did he really intend? Consider the actions and
intentions of Hitler and Chamberlain prior to the outbreak of World
War II. In these cases we have factual proof of action possessing an
intentional structure, or a goal-direction, radically at odds with its
conscious intention.
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And such actions must be judged morally. We are prepared, I believe, to say that both Hitler and Chamberlain were morally blameworthy men, the one for his almost diabolical craving for universal
destruction (however much he may have spoken of peace and German
fulfillment)29 and the other for his cowardice and preoccupation with
immediate selfish advantage (however much he may have spoken of
reasonable compromise in the interest of peace). 30 Are we not prepared
to recognize, moreover, the corporate moral guilt of the Englishmen
who cheered Chamberlain on his return from Munich and of the
Americans who relied on Washington's Farewell Address to justify
avoidance of entanglements on behalf of freedom in Europe? But did
these Englishmen and Americans consciously intend to behave as
cowards or to evade their moral obligations on the Continent?
More prosaically and perhaps more convincingly still, consider the
Christmas dinner at which the spinster aunt, in the shrill voice of
Carry Nation, delivers a temperance lecture while the father is opening
a bottle of wine saved for the occasion. Are we to deny that the aunt's
dislike of the father for having destroyed her only immediate family by
marrying her sister, and the aunt's envy of her sister for being the
mother in another family, are expressed in her action? Are we to
believe that she does not desire and intend to hurt this family, to
dampen the pleasures of its Christmas feast? Yet who would call the
aunt a liar when later, in tears, she apologizes for having spoiled the
celebration while she continues to insist that her only concern was
for the welfare of the father and mother and children who are going
to destroy their health by drinking? The aunt can claim, with complete
justification, that her love for the family has been fully demonstrated
by her generous and loving support in times of extreme hardship at
great personal sacrifice to herself. But it is equally true that she is
resentful of the family and full of hate. And since her actions are
hers, it is not surprising that they should reveal much more of herself
than she consciously intends to express: what she does is a function of
all that she is, all her loves, hates, and wants, and not merely the expression of what she consciously intends when she acts. In this case all
of her action, including its disruptive consequences and its good and
bad will, was intended and was done intentionally, despite the fact that
her conscious intention was merely to save the family she loved from
29 Mircea Eliade lays great stress on the National Socialists' selection of the Nordic
myths as an expression of national purpose: the goal is ragnark-total destruction of gods,
heroes, and men! M. EuEDE, MYTHs, DREAMS AND MYsrEmS 26-27 (1957).
30 When Chamberlain said that he brought back from Munich "Peace for our time," he
let the cat out of the bag. It is not hard to find the intent behind that phrase or behind
the equally famous "Aprhs nous le ddluge."
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alcoholism. The most accurate account of this situation is one which
simply accepts as fact the presence of unconscious and often ambivalent
intentions.
Five years ago in Austin, Texas, a man charged with the murder of
his wife claimed in his defense that he had killed her while sleeping
or immediately on awakening.31 Psychologists and psychiatrists testified
to the possibility of this occurrence. And if the man had lived happily
with his wife for twenty years, one might be inclined to excuse his act
on the grounds that it was unintentional. According to the evidence,
however, the man and his wife fought frequently, and he had planned
on two occasions to divorce his wife in order to marry another woman.
By his own admission he dreamed that he was killing an intruder who
was chasing his nieces before awakening to find that he had killed his
wife. I would accept as factual that the man killed his wife while in
an unconscious or subconscious state. But I see no reason for concluding, as Hart or Hampshire would, that the man did what he did
unintentionally and, consequently, that he is to be excused from moral
blame for killing his wife. (Nor would I argue, on the other hand, that
he should be found guilty or punished in a court of law on the basis of
these facts unless and until careful safeguards and limitations have
been developed for the introduction of such evidence. I fully recognize
that the implementation of my theory in legal practice requires the
development of solutions to a host of special problems. Neither the
problems nor their solutions can be dealt with here.)
Hart insists that a person is to be excused from moral blame if he
can establish "that he did this unintentionally and in spite of every
precaution it was possible for him to take." Now if we admit that the
man killed his wife while in a non-conscious state and that consciousness is required for intention, it follows that in this case the man did
what he did unintentionally. And unless we consider him reckless or
negligent for having continued to sleep in the same bed with his wife
after having quarrelled with her,3 2 we have no basis for claiming that
he failed to take every precaution it was possible for him to take. We
cannot fault him for having failed to consult a psychiatrist or marriage
counsellor; recourse to such professional help presupposes a level of
education and sophistication which the accused had not attained.33
On Hart's view, we must conclude, therefore, that the man was neither
State v. Blomquist, No. 3391 (D. Tex., May 17, 1962).
Survival of the institution of marriage would require the negligence of most of the
adult population if such a consideration were made a rule of law.
33 We will discuss later the problem of accounting for negligent conduct on a theory
which recognizes only a conscious level of intention and awareness. See Marshall, Relation
of the Unconscious to Intention, 52 VA. L. REy. 1256 (1966).
31
32
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negligent nor intentional in his behavior, hence that he did not offend
voluntarily, hence that he is excused from moral responsibility and
blame.3 4 This, in my opinion, constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of
the view that limits ascription of moral blame and responsibility to
voluntary, consciously intended acts, the view that moral offenses must
be voluntary and that in order to be voluntary they must be consciously
intended.
There are at least two ways of avoiding this absurdity and acknowledging the moral responsibility of the agent in this case. First, we may
hold that, since the man had no conscious intention to kill his wife, his
bodily movements in killing her do not constitute an action, and hence
that killing her was not voluntary. In this way we preserve'the usages
of Hart and Hampshire. But then we are forced to abandon Hart's
thesis that moral offenses are voluntary: we are forced to predicate the
man's responsibility on his being, or status, rather than on his voluntary action. We now avoid the absurdity of excusing him by morally
blaming him for being a man who killed his wife even though he did
not kill her voluntarily or intentionally.
Or, second, we may describe what the man did in terms of action, intention, and volition developed on a continuum view of responsibility.
We may hold that there was a degree of voluntariness in his action
proportionate to the degree and kind of intentionality and, consequently, a corresponding degree of moral blame. We would have to
assess the degree and quality of his intention by reference to what he
had thought, said, dreamed, and done about his.wife in the preceding
months and years. And to the degree that the man's intentions, as so
assessed, were apparent in his bodily movements of killing her, we
would describe those movements as, to that degree, his voluntary
action. 35 This second way, by far the soundest in my judgment, provides a better fit of facts to theory than the first way. It imposes, moreover, very little strain on traditional linguistic usage and offers qualified support for the traditional view, represented by Hart,36 of the
voluntary character of moral offenses.
34 Hart would not necessarily excuse him from legal responsibility. Hart would not
accept without serious qualifications Jerome Hall's position that "Penal law implies moral
culpability." J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 347 (2d ed. 1960).
35 Here I am making a theoretical point about law and morals. Practically speaking, it
will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" what a man has
thought or dreamed. Some move might nonetheless be made in this direction. It must be
emphasized, moreover, that the introduction of such considerations might be made for
the purpose of exonerating a person or for mitigating his guilt. It would be a serious
mistake to suppose that the view I am developing tends more to incriminate than to
exonerate mankind. My argument does not increase one's moral and legal responsibility;
rather, it attempts to redefine and clarify the nature and scope of responsibility.
36 I have indicated at several points in this paper that Hart's statement represents, or is
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On the second view we recognize that there must be some element
of intention and some degree of voluntariness in a series of bodily
movements if those movements are to be called an action and if the
action is to be subject to moral judgment. At the same time, moreover,
we recognize the essential co-presence of elements of status responsibility. The mixture of kinds of responsibility reflects with accuracy the
mixture of being and doing in personal action. It reflects the fact that
what a man does is a function of what he, in the context of his situation,
is, and that what he is within this context is revealed by what he does.
The partial truth of the voluntary conception of responsibility is acknowledged through the recognition that what a man does is the ratio
cognoscendi of what he is, and the partial truth of the status conception
of responsibility is acknowledged through the recognition that what a
man in context is is the ratio essendi of what he does. This view can
also accommodate the existential point that what a man is and does determines or creates what he shall be and do; that his existence can give
rise to a new essence.
We are compelled then, largely by factual considerations, to reject
the view that intentions are necessarily or always consciously intended,
that a person must be conscious of his intention in order to act intentionally. We are forced, that is, to reject the view that a person can establish
that he acted unintentionally if he can show that he did not consciously
intend to do what he did. And when the concept of intention is extended, the character of moral offenses and the criteria of moral excusability are altered; we recognize, for example, the possibility of being
morally blameworthy for what we do on the basis of unconscious or
subconscious intentions in the absence of any conscious intention to
violate moral rules or principles or to neglect any values that should
be enhanced.
And we have taken only the first step toward confronting factually and
acknowledging theoretically the larger range, scope, and depth of mental
concepts. The enlargement of the concept of intention must be accompanied by a comparable enlargement of the concept of awareness. The
importance of this step can be seen most clearly in the present context
if we ask whether a person can be morally blameworthy for negligent
conduct. Hart recognizes, of course, the difference between intentional
or purposive action and action which is done with knowledge or conscious awareness but without intent. He insists that the person whose
action violates some moral rule or principle must, in order to excuse his
representative of, the generally accepted view of the voluntary character of moral offenses.
I selected Hart's statement for examination because it epitomizes the view that has been
dominant among ethical writers from Aristotle to Kant and because of its clarity and
brevity.
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conduct, establish not merely that he acted unintentionally, but also
that he did not know that he was running any avoidable risk of violating them. He must establish that, in Hart's words: "[H]e did this . ..
in spite of every precaution that it was possible for him to take." Thus,
in order to be excused morally, the person is required to prove that
his conduct was not reckless. But on Hart's view a person is not required to show that his action was non-negligent, for negligence, unlike recklessness, does not involve any state of awareness:
It is the case where the actor creates inadvertently a risk of
which he ought to be aware, considering its nature and degree,
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the care that would
be exercised by a reasonable person in his situation.37
If Hart takes a narrow view of mind, intention, and awareness, and if he
holds that moral offenses must be voluntary-by which he means that
they must be avoidable by means available to the agent at the time he
acts--how can the agent be blameworthy for failing to take a precaution of which he was not aware and which was therefore not available to
him at the time he acted? If the agent is aware of reasonable precautions
which he is neglecting to take, he is acting recklessly. But if he is not
aware of any reasonable precautions that he is neglecting to take, in what
sense can it be possible for him to take them? In what sense can he be
voluntarily negligent and therefore morally blameworthy for his negligence?
It makes no sense to include among possible precautions that one
ought to take precautions of which one is not consciously aware unless
it is recognized that there are various modes of awareness, including
peripheral, subconscious and unconscious modes, and that there are
purposive acts of forgetting, repressing, neglecting, etc. If we accept the
fact that persons express through their actions intentions of which they
are not fully or even partially conscious, and if we give credence to the
psychoanalytic and psychological evidence of repression and other forms
of subconscious or unconscious awareness and activity, then-but only
then-have we a sound factual basis for extending the concept of moral
blameworthiness to truly negligent behavior. For it is only after we
accept this evidence as factual that we have a basis for identifying the
presence and effects of the person in such conduct. It is another shortcoming of the traditional view that moral offenses must be voluntary
in the sense that they must be avoidable by means of which the agent is
aware, that it limits moral blame to actions which are either intentional
87

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment at 126 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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or consciously reckless and, hence, that it cannot impute moral blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness) for truly negligent conduct.3 8
On the basis of the extended view of awareness and intentionality, by
contrast, it is possible to hold a person morally blameworthy and legally
culpable for genuinely negligent conduct. And by the extension of the
meanings of these mental concepts-in response to factual evidence, be
it noted, and not to the "logic" or usage of these terms-we need not
abandon but only qualify the traditional requirements that morally
blameworthy acts be voluntary and that legally culpable conduct involve
mens rea.3 9 In holding a person morally blameworthy or legally culpable
for truly negligent behavior we recognize the presence of the person
existing and functioning mentally on some level in the process of acting.
We recognize degrees of moral blameworthiness or legal culpability appropriate to the degree and kind of personal presence in the action.
The greater the degree of consciousness in awareness and intention, the
greater the degree of voluntariness and mens rea; hence the greater the
degree of moral and legal responsibility.4 0 Once again we confront
increasing or decreasing continua of awareness, intention, mens rea,
etc., on which our judgments-on continua scales--of the presence and
degree of personality, voluntariness, action, responsibility, blameworthiness and culpability are based.
Because there is still much doubt (a good deal of which may be fully
merited) about the soundness and relevance of data provided by depth
psychology and psychoanalysis, I do not want to rest my case against
the traditional, simplistic concept of voluntary responsibility exclusively
or even primarily on such data. By restricting ourselves to familiar
8 In my consideration of the case in which the Texas man killed his wife, State v. Blomquist, No. 33391 (D. Tex., May 17, 1962), I dealt superficially with the question of his possible "recklessness or negligence" because I had not yet introduced the technical distinction
between negligence and recklessness. In retrospect it should be clear that the theory as
represented by Hart is reduced to an absurdity when applied to this case because the
man's conduct was morally excusable since it was, in terms of the theory, neither inten-

tional, negligent, nor reckless.
31 Professor Herbert Packer, supra note 4, has urged the consideration of negligence as
a conceptual halfway house between strict liability and mens tea. If we accept as factual
a side of mental life of which we are not directly conscious but which, according to many
psychologists and psychoanalysts, accounts for slips of the tongue, deliberate forgetting,
and other failures that can be grouped under the general heading of negligent behavior,
a substantial element of the mens tea requirement could be reintroduced into criminal

and tort law under rules concerning negligence at points where at present rules of strict
liability are used or where negligence is treated as if it were devoid entirely of mens tea
and hence where rules of negligence are applied exactly as rules of strict liability.

40 A continuum theory of human conduct and responsibility may have been behind and
is certainly required by the A.L.I. proposal of four modes of culpability, which in

descending order are: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. See
CODE § 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

MODEL PENAL
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experiences in daily life-without appeal to psychoanalytic interpretation-we can expose the inadequacy of the view that a person can
excuse himself for morally offensive conduct by showing that he did
what he did unintentionally and after taking every possible precaution.
According to Hart's statement, if a person meets these criteria: "Moral
blame is therefore excluded because he has done all that he can do...
[and] in morals 'I could not help it' is always an excuse." But we can
show, I think, that "I could not help it" is not always an excuse because moral responsibility can have no meaning in human affairs unless
there are times and situations in which one is morally responsible (deserving of moral praise or blame) for what he is, whether he could have
helped being what he is or not. That is to say, I wish to show by reference to uncontested facts of human experience that the concept of moral
responsibility (and, by limitation, moral offense) involves some minimal
element of status responsibility and cannot be based solely on voluntary
responsibility. To show this at least sketchily will be the burden of the
final part of this paper.
III
It is often mistakenly assumed in philosophical discussions of action,
intention, person, and responsibility that everyone is clear about the
precise, and even logical, difference between an event and an action,
between an action and its consequences, between a voluntary and an
involuntary action or movement, between a person and a thing. In fact,
however, there is great uncertainty and fuzziness on all these matters:
wherever we look we seem to find one item or concept fading by imperceptible degrees into another from which it is alleged to be factually
or even logically distinct.
A.
We find for example, not merely the gradations of personality,
agency, and responsibility in the sequential observation of comatose,
vegetative, senile, idiotic, infantile, stupid, sleeping, insane, neurotic,
normal, wakeful, rational, articulate, intelligent or imaginative persons,
we also find a spectrum of action, personality and responsibility in the
daily life of any ordinary human being. Consider the following experiences of X:
1. While walking aimlessly in his garden, he steps on a thorn and
feels a terribly sharp pain.
2. While playing badminton in his garden, he steps on a thorn and
feels some pain.
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3. While in a desperate struggle with an intruder in his garden, he
steps on a thorn and feels no pain at all.
4. While asleep he dreams of a stranger who is killed and whose
estate is inherited by his brother.
5. Working in his garden while hungry he thinks suddenly of eating
bacon and eggs.
6. Working in his garden he thinks of his brother who is on military
duty in the war zone, and he offers silent prayer for his safety.
In the midst of the prayer the thought crosses his mind that if
his brother is killed, he will inherit his brother's estate.
7. Hungry but still at work in his garden, he decides to cook those
eggs and bacon.
8. As he is going inside, he thinks, "I don't want my brother
dead; what a scoundrel I must be for having a thought like
that."
9. He prepares lunch.
10. His brother comes in unexpectedly on a military leave granted
so that he can recuperate from a wound and lead poisoning; X
invites his brother to eat with him.
11. X decides to slip a fatal dose of powdered lead into the eggs
before serving his brother.
12. X puts the poison in the eggs.
13. He serves the eggs to his brother.
Here we have a continuum of situations from events to moral action
in which a gradual increase of personal involvement and responsibility
is shown. At what point shall we speak of action rather than mere
event? At what point does the personality of X express itself in what
happens or in what is done? At what point do we speak properly of
moral responsibility or moral blameworthiness? Of legal responsibility
41
or culpability?
X's personality and personal involvement are apparent from the
outset. Even the way in which X feels pain in No. 1 has elements of
action about it. The intensity of his pain is a function, presumably,
of his degree of abstraction while walking, and of his normal pain
threshold. If he has a low threshold and vivid memory of such experiences, the pain may be excruciating and he may relive the shock for
hours or days. If his threshold is high a single "Dammit!" and the
removal of the thorn may be all there is to it. Now are we to suppose,
41 My discussion of these thirteen situations will of necessity be very brief and sketchy;
nevertheless, it should serve to carry the reader on his own through many of the considerations which I find relevant.
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in the interest of precision or clarity, that X's reaction to stepping on
a thorn is just a reaction, a psychophysical event in which there is no
personal involvement and no element of action? Can we doubt that
X's response will be not merely indicative but largely determinative
of his action in a situation of moral crisis in which the threat of pain
is involved? If, while later serving in the army, X were taken prisoner,
how would he respond to the mere threat of physical torture? Can we
assess his moral responsibility by asking, "Could he help doing whatever he does?" If his pain threshold is low and his memory of past
pains and his imagination of pains to come are vivid, can he help
divulging secrets on the mere threat of torture, whereas he would not
divulge them even after torture, were his pain threshold high and his
imagination and memory less vivid? Does it make any more sense to
say "He could not help doing what he did" than to say "He could have
avoided being who he was"? Or does it make any more sense to say
"He could have avoided doing what he did" than to say "He could
have avoided being who he was"? If what a man does is not a function
of what he is, in what sense can his action be his? But if what a man
does is a function of what he is, such questions make no sense. The
proper question for the assessment of moral responsibility should
rather be: "What kind of person is he-that is, under what conditions,
both external and internal, does he do or would he do what he did?"
I see no way of determining whether or not X can be different from
what he is or could be different from what he was at any particular
time. Likewise, I see no way to determine whether he can do differently from what he does or could do differently from what he did at
any particular time. But there are ways to determine to some extent
the conditions under which X does what he does and is likely to do
what he will do-that is, we can come to know something about his
character, including his moral character, and a statement of his character is a description of his being-doing.
Now if X screams and cries when he steps on the thorn in No. 1, we
may be able to talk to him about his behavior and train him so that
he will exercise greater control on the next occurrence. When on the
next occurrence he shows greater control, stiff upper lip, etc., are we
to say that praise is inappropriate for it is only another event and not
an action for which X can be praised? Hardly. The fact is that we
train children to exercise control-and hence to act to a minimal
degree-even in the way that they experience pain. I can hear a critic
saying: "But you train the child to control his response to the pain,
not to alter his experience of it." It is probable that control would be
impossible in cases of intense pain if there were no way of altering
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the experience itself. The unity of mind-body in human experience
has been seriously underestimated by philosophers since Descartes.
They have also underestimated or ignored the personal controls that
we know are operative, but which we are not aware of as operating in
such basic processes as perception.
But if one questions the presence of minimal personal involvement
and therefore a minimal element of action in No. 1, what will one say
about No. 2 or No. 3? If we argue that the adjustments in the awareness of pain made in No. 2 and No. 3 are merely bodily adjustments
having nothing to do with the person involved, we shall be left with
a high abstraction instead of a richly concrete person. The extent of
the reduction in the awareness of pain in No. 2 is not merely a function of the attention areas in the brain; it is likewise a function of X's
involvement in the game. If he doesn't like the game, the pain is likely
to be far more intense than if he were extremely fond of it. The
greater his competitive involvement, the less intense the pain. If he
is playing with a young woman in whom he has a strong romantic
interest, his pain may be either lessened or intensified according to his
courting technique, quite apart from the question of whether he will
feign greater or lesser pain for courtship purposes. His personality will
express itself instantaneously in the midst of play prior to his conscious
assertion of secondary control. I see no reason to deny that the initial
response is his personal response, not merely an organic reaction,
though I should not want to deny the greater element of personal
involvement expressed through his secondary control.
I acknowledge that pain must not be too intense if the element of
personal action is to be found in the very perception of it. Pain so
intense as to produce almost instantaneous loss of consciousness is
dearly of a different sort. But this consideration should not blind us
to the minimal expression of the person in the experience of less
severe pains.
In a situation like No. 3 we should condemn a soldier or an athlete
who did not suppress virtually all awareness of pain. (I introduce
athletes into a situation like No. 3 out of consideration of American
professional football which is much more like No. 3 than No. 2.) If
he continued to feel pain from a thorn to the point that it interfered
with his fighting, we should probably deny that "He did all that he
could to control the pain." (Note we do speak of controlling pain
when we can mean nothing other than controlling the way we experience it rather than the response we make to it.) We should be inclined,
I think, to say that a football player who felt enough pain from a thorn
in the foot to be seriously distracted by it while engaged in "hand to
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hand combat" cared too little about winning the game and "had not
done all he could do" to win it. Whether or not we regard his failure
as morally blameworthy depends on how seriously we take the game
and whether we view it as a moral struggle, but not on the character
of his action. His personal involvement, minimal though it be, is
sufficient to justify imputation of some very small degree of moral
blame.
By the time we come to situation No. 4, I should suppose the presence of personal involvement and responsibility would be generally
acknowledged. It was Plato, not Freud, who first stressed the moral
significance of dreams and who insisted that it was important to
consider a person's dreams when assessing his moral character. It is
universally acknowledged that dreams reveal the desires of the dreamer:
starving men dream of sumptuous meals; sexually deprived persons
dream of sexually pleasing objects; bed-wetting children dream of
toilets while they wet their beds. Now if we add to these commonplace observations Freud's theory of dream censorship, we find an
important similarity between No. 4 and No. 6. Freud would morally
credit X for his dream work, for his censorship of his dream. He would
assert that X's love or respect for his brother, or at least his acknowledgement of his brother's right to live, was expressed in his suppression of the true content of his dream and in his provision of the
manifest content. Freud would say that X was a better man for dreaming what he dreamed in No. 4 than if he had dreamed directly of his
brother's death, for his dream in No. 4 shows that he disapproved of
his own desire. 42 Without trading on the metaphysics of psychoanalysis, I should argue that X's incompatible wants were revealed in No. 4:
his affection for his brother is in conflict with his desire for his
brother's estate. And I should argue that we can never make sense of
personal or moral responsibility unless we recognize the expression
of the person and hence a mode of personal action, if not in one's
dreams, at least in one's wants and desires.
By moving from No. 4 to No. 5 we confront essentially the same
issues but in a context in which the rejection of Freud's or Plato's
interpretation of dreams poses no threat to my position. But I do not
wish to deny what seems to me the clear moral relevance of dream
behavior. I contend that no one would knowingly hire a baby sitter who
frequently dreamed of killing kittens or chickens, much less one who
dreamed frequently of killing children. We all know perfectly well that
our dreams reveal ourselves, our persons. When I was a child of eight
42 S. FREUD, Some Additional Notes upon Dream-Interpretationas a Whole: (B) Moral
Responsibility for the Control of Dreams, in 5 COLLECrED PAPERS 154 (Strachey ed. 1959).
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-and long before I had heard of Freud-I dreamed on two occasions
of the deaths of my parents. In these dreams I basked in the emotional
glory of being the "poor little orphan." When I awoke I was ashamed
of myself for indulging in those gratifying thoughts of having everyone sorry for me at the cost of losing my parents. I considered then,
and now consider that a moral fault (admittedly of trivial importance)
was revealed in those dreams. But I would not know what it means
to be me or what my moral quality as a person were unless I based my
judgment on all indices of myself. I might add that in dreams in which
I have "done the right thing" in a situation of great temptation I
have awakened mildly pleased with myself. Only a fool would ignore
what he can learn of himself through his personal activity in dreams.
For the sake of those who reject Joseph along with Plato and Freud,
however, there are always No. 5 and No. 6. If in a fully conscious
state I think of the attractive consequences of my brother's death in
a situation in which I am concerned for his well-being (I need not be
praying about it), I must obviously recognize my ambivalence toward
him. And if I have no basis for wishing him ill, must I not recognize
my personal involvement and agency in the morally blameworthy
thought of the attractive consequences of his death? Let me emphasize
once more that we are speaking here of microscopic blame. X could
not be called a basically morally bad person because he had the dream
in No. 4 or the thought in No. 6 unless they were interpreted later
in light of Nos. 11, 12, or 13. But the continuum of personal activity
and responsibility is what I wish to stress. And I think we find in No.
6 a significant though minuscule instance of personal agency, responsibility and, indeed, moral blameworthiness. The degree is far greater,
moreover, than in situations No. 1 through No. 5.
Situations No. 4 through No. 6 show that a person's wants are a
part of him and an expression of his personal agency. A man who will
not assume responsibility for his desires and wants may just as well
deny responsibility for his mind-body. I believe that what I say accords
with the findings of clinical psychology insofar as the person who
does not recognize himself in his desires and wants and in the subtle
ways in which their intensity bespeaks his control of them, antecedent
to consciously deliberate control, is suffering some degree of mental
illness. (Ego is no longer master; repression is terribly extended, etc.)
In situations No. 1 through No. 6 we have the gradual emergence
of clearly recognizable action from events in which faint but significant traces of personal activity are found. In situations No. 6 through
No. 13 we have actions in which there is a gradual development of
conscious deliberation and moral responsibility. Numbers 11 through
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13 can be described as one action or as three, but the quality of the
decision in No. 11 is not fully revealed until the occurrence of No. 13.
X's decision in No. 11 may not have been fully determinate even in
the mind of X at the time it was made. His decisiveness becomes complete as his action develops. But even at No. 13 there may be irresolution: No. 13 may be followed by a No. 14 in which X snatches the
plate away before his brother can eat. The person of X may change
and develop in the tension of the situations. But his being will never
be separated from his doing; he is and does together and at once. It
makes no sense at any point to say that he could have done differently
unless he could have been different.
Of course there were alternatives open to X at every point from
No. 1 through No. 13 and, as we noted, alternates remain open after
No. 13. But were there alternatives which X could have taken while
being what he was at each instance? This is the question we cannot
answer with any empirical guarantees. Only the metaphysicians of
free will or determinism can fight this issue through. But we can recognize the important differences in the quality or kind of alternatives
available to X. We note that his awareness and conscious deliberations are on an increase from No. 1 through No. 13. His alternative
at No. I may be little more than the possibility of accepting or rejecting himself as the person he is and deciding on a course of training
to raise his pain threshold. Indeed in all situations from No. 1 through
No. 5 his action or activity is not so much planned as happening. And
his act of praying in No. 6 is a sudden impulse (though a morally
significant and revealing one). But in No. 7 there is planning. He
decides on a course of action-which is itself an action or part of one
-before he goes inside or gathers the food and the utensils and
begins to cook. Time passes between the action of No. 7 and the
cooking of the eggs. And in every moment of time there are occasions
in which his person can express itself in different ways if his person
is such that the expression comes forth. But time, the sine qua non
for alteration of plans, for the expression of ambivalence or contrary
desires or intentions, for deliberation and thoughtful consideration, is
provided. And the person whose action has been undertaken and
sustained through prolonged moments of time, in which deliberation
and consideration of alternative desires, wants, intentions and plans
may express themselves through the alteration of the course of that
action, is more fully identified and identifiable with that action than a
person whose action is of less duration down to the point of being
almost instantaneous. Enduring action in which the full capacities of
the person are engaged is what is properly meant by voluntary action:
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it is expressive of the volition of the person; it reveals what the personal agent wants to come to pass in the world and what he wants
to be.
Concerning voluntary action, we can say that there was time and
opportunity for the agent to do differently from what he did had he
been a different person from what he was. Hence we are prepared to
blame him more for such action, because his personal identification
with and in such action is greater. In blaming him severely only for
voluntary actions, however, we are not denying that we are blaming
him for what he is as well as for what he does. We blame him more
severely because his fully conscious mind and deliberative choice are
expressed in temporally extended voluntary action. We blame him
less severely for impulsive or responsive actions or for dream actions
precisely because far less of himself is expressed in or identified with
them.
B.
In section A we examined an event-action continuum in which we
observed the gradual increment of personal expression as we moved
from cases of predominantly event-like reaction, through those involving sudden responses, dream work, impulsive thoughts or desires,
to cases of maximally conscious, voluntary and deliberative action.
The continuum was one of increasing personal involvement and
expression, increasing voluntariness, and increasing responsibility.
Throughout we found, moreover, the co-presence of personal being and
personal doing, and we observed the artificiality that results from the
separation of the person's being from his doing.
In section A we observed and considered only a small aspect of the
ontological foundation of action and responsibility. Action and responsibility depend on far more than the being and doing of the
agent himself; they depend also on the being and doing of other agents
and finally upon the general matrix of action, including all of the
ontological conditions on which action depends. The ontological
matrix of action no less than the intentions of the agent sets the
determinate limits of action and the degrees and quality of responsibility.
Let us resume our consideration of X by supposing that each of the
following situations is an alternative successor to No. 13:
14. X snatches away the eggs just before his brother eats them.
15. X's brother begins to eat, feels sick almost at once and stops
eating before consuming a fatal amount; X throws away the
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eggs a) in happy relief that the plan has failed, or b) in anger
that his plan has failed.
16. X's brother eats the fatal meal and dies.
17. After serving the poisoned eggs, X leaves the house for a few
minutes; while he is gone his mother enters, partakes of the
poisoned meal, and a) both she and the brother die, or b) the
brother feels sick, does not eat, and only the mother dies.
In No. 14, X is still in control as much as any voluntary agent is in
control of his action; that is, his action has not yet set in motion or
been caught up by forces that may result in a disrelation between his
action and his plan or intention. In No. 14 we see that the determination, expressed with increasing clarity and force from No. 11 through
No. 13 is still far from steadfast or overpowering. In No. 14 we find
that determination is shaken by competing aspects of X's personality
and interests; his action now expresses perhaps either his prudential
concern for his own safety and well-being, his continuing but ambivalent love for his brother, or his respect for law. X's movement in No.
13 may have been impulsive: an expression on his brother's face may
have reminded X of a happy incident from their childhood. Alternatively, his movement may have been deliberate: he may have known,
even as he was serving the plate and carrying it to the table, that he
would have to snatch it away at the last; perhaps he only toyed with
the idea of murder and even savored the moral test he was putting
himself through. The range of possibilities is almost infinite.
But No. 14, whether impulsive or deliberate, forces us to reassess
X's blame. Our judgment made on the basis of No. 11 through No. 13
is no longer adequate. If X's action from No. 11 through No. 13 was
deliberate while his action in No. 14 was impulsive, can we allow our
judgment based on No. 11 through No. 13 to stand? Shall we argue
that No. 11 through No. 13 prove that he intended to murder his
brother and that it is immaterial that he was stopped by an expression
on his brother's face rather than, as in No. 15, by the fact that his
brother does not eat the poisoned food? Shall we argue that he was
stopped in either case by an accident insofar as he was concerned? We
must argue, I think, that he is to be credited morally for his response
to his brother's expression in a way that he is not to be credited for
his brother's refusal to eat the food-though both accidents, if that is
what they are, partially determine his moral worth. Much of X is
centrally involved in his response to his brother's facial expression: it
is not just the expression but the expression as seen by X that accounts
for X's throwing away the eggs. The expression as seen by X shatters
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his resolution and alters his intention, whereas there is no break in
X's intention in No. 15b. We must give X moral credit for his response to his brother's expression, or for his deliberate consideration
in which his love for his brother was reasserted, or for his thought
of his brother's right to live and the wrongness of murder, no matter
how intensely he may have hated his brother.
We must give X moral credit, though to a lesser extent, even if his
action in No. 14 expresses nothing more than his prudent concern for
his own safety; there is an important element of moral goodness in
the man who is law-abiding even for the wrong reasons-he does not
destroy some of the values that the laws protect. Or are we so carried
away by the moral daredeviltry of formalistic, voluntaristic ethics that
we find no moral worth in law-abiding conduct which is prompted by
selfish motives?
The situation in No. 15 seems radically different from No. 14, but
it is only gradationally different. In No. 15 the action has clearly
moved beyond the voluntary control of X. But did X have voluntary
control over his brother's expression in No. 14, or over the present
strength of his love for his brother, or over the education that developed whatever sense of duty and respect for the lives of others that
may have moved him in No. 14? We know what X was in No. 14, but
we must not slip back into the mistake of supposing that X could
have done differently in No. 14 any more than in No. 15 without
having been a different man in these situations.
Since the situation in No. 15 is nonetheless beyond the voluntary
control of X, what should we conclude concerning his responsibility?
His maximally voluntary responsibility must be assessed by reference
to his reaction to the failure of his plan-to the truncation of his
action. In 15b we find that his resolution was complete: X did his
best to kill his brother and never wavered in his intention. We can
say, as I suggested in another paper,4 3 that X murdered unsuccessfully.
But that is a misleading way of putting it, for it is a brute fact that in
No. 15, X did not murder his brother. The continued existence of his
brother provides an ontological refutation of any charge of murder.
X has been saved by his brother's sensitive digestive system from the
crime of murder. Although X did all he could to bring it about, although his voluntary involvement was complete, his action was terminated short of its completion. His action was defined by his intention
to kill his brother, but his action was terminated a) after he had done
all that he could to realize his intention but b) before his action had
43 See Silber, Human Action and the Language of Volitions, 44 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELLAN SocIETY 199 (1964).
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been completed by his brother's death. In 15b we have a situation in
which the ontological matrix of the action does not support the volitional matrix, and the discrepancy is effectively articulated, in my
opinion, by the traditional language of volition. X willed to kill his
brother and is morally blameworthy for his acts of volition even
though he did not succeed.
But is X as morally blameworthy for having willed, but failed, to
kill his brother, as he would have been if his action had fit his intention; if, that is, his volitional act had been completed by his brother's
death?44 Unless we banish from ethics all concern for the realization
of values, our answer must be that X is not so blameworthy. In spite
of his volition X is not guilty in No. 15 of having destroyed a human
life with all its valuesl If in No. 16 X can be held responsible morally
for his brother's action in eating the eggs and for the action of the
poison within his brother's system, why should he not be relieved of
some responsibility and blame if these intended and probable consequences of his efforts in preparing and serving the eggs do not take
place?
The traditional answer has been that X intended the consequences
and did everything in his power to bring them about; hence, they are
a part of his action and he is morally accountable for them whether
they happened or not. Persuasive as this answer is, it overstates the
case. It ignores the absence of certain elements of being or status
requisite to full moral responsibility. The man who has attempted
murder, as X has in No. 15b, is as guilty volitionally as he can possibly
be. But he lacks the being or status of a murderer. It would be a reductio ad absurdum of the theory of voluntary responsibility to
assume that he would not be far more blameworthy had he acted in
an ontological matrix that supported his intent and brought about its
full realization. On the other hand, it would be a reductio ad absurdum of the theory of status responsibility to assume that the man
who has attempted but failed to commit murder has no moral guilt
as a murderer just because his victim is still alive and unharmed. His
volitional offense still stands.
Much more needs to be said about the ontological matrix of action.
44 We raise this question while recognizing that to will something, unlike merely to
wish it, involves a determined effort on the part of the agent; within the limits of his

capacities, the agent does everything he thinks is required for the fulfillment of his intention. If one wills something to happen, its failure to come to pass cannot be imputed
to the volition of the agent for if he wills it he does what he can to bring it about and
does nothing to prevent it. I do not accept any para-mechanical theory of the relation of
mind to body or any of the other horrible things that Ryle alleges are accepted by those
who use the language of volitions. See id.
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But it is already clear that it can alter the agent's action despite his
intention or volition and, hence, that it can alter his moral and legal
responsibility. If we limit our considerations merely to X's awareness
of himself and ignore what the law or his family might think of him
we must recognize the difference in what he as a person is in No. 15
(whether a or b), and what he is in No. 16. According to No. 15, X
is not a murderer although he has a murderous will in No. 15b and
may have no better than an ambivalently murderous will in No. 15a.
In both Nos. 15a and 15b, however, there are redemptive possibilities
open to X that are closed by No. 16. Reconciliation with his brother
is only the most obvious. By considering the difference between X
in No. 15 and X in No. 16 we see plainly his finitude both physically
and morally: he is dependent with regard to both his moral guilt and
virtue on many ontological factors that are not under his control, not
even in the weakened sense of being expressions of his volitional
being. This fact of the dependency of his moral virtue or guilt on ontological factors beyond his control is not acknowledged by the traditional view of moral responsibility according to which one deserves
credit or blame only for what he has done voluntarily. The traditional
view necessarily ignores this fact because it has ignored the ontological
foundations of voluntary action.
In No. 15a we have a situation that is similar in many respects to
one of the situations we considered in interpreting No. 14. X's resolution is still divided and incomplete. He is still ambivalent; in many
ways he is still the man he was in No. 6 and No. 8. Fortunately45 he is
not a murderer with regrets and remorse but only a man who has
come very close to being one. He is protected from or relieved of some
moral blame by the collapse of the ontological matrix required for the
completion of his murderous intent. X's moral blameworthiness under
15a must, nevertheless, be substantially greater than it is under No.
14, no matter how we construe X's motives in No. 14. There is an
incremental rise in X's blameworthiness as we move from the interpretation of No. 14 as motivated by X's respect for law to No. 14 as motivated by prudence. In No. 14 his being and doing are largely decisive;
in No. 15, however, his intended action is truncated by the collapse
of the larger ontological matrix for which X has far less responsibility.
Since X has far less to do with the truncation of his action in No. 15
than with his own termination of his action in No. 14, there is no
basis for reducing his moral blameworthiness in No. 15b at all, or in
45 I used the word "fortunately" in order to assert again the shocking fact that luck,
accident, or fortune plays important and partially determinative roles in the shaping and
assessing of moral responsibility.
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No. 15a more than slightly, insofar as it is based upon elements of
voluntary responsibility. But X's blameworthiness based on elements
of status responsibility is not substantially greater in No. 15 than in
No. 14, though it rises sharply in No. 16.
In No. 16 X's act is fulfilled, completely realized. His intention and
volition are fully and accurately expressed in and supported by the
ontological matrix which includes his brother's act of eating and
digesting and the poison's causal efficacy. X would not and could not
be a murderer without the support of this or some other matrix over
which he has no control. In No. 16 there is no increment of intention,
determination, or voluntariness in X's action over what was present in
No. 15b; the increase in his moral blameworthiness in No. 16 over
No. 15b must come therefore from an increase in his status or ontological responsibility. The fit of intention and volition to the ontological
matrix is perfect: the full action is expressed in this absence of disrelation between intention and occurrence, between volition and being.
The full action is morally imputed to X because the person of X is so
transparently present in this fusion of doing and being.
Another sort of disrelationship between action and intention is
introduced by No. 17 (for the sake of brevity we will concentrate on
No. 7b). Here we observe the extension of an action beyond the
limits intended by and directly influenced by the agent. We may suppose that X had no relatives or friends in the city other than his
mother and brother; we may likewise suppose that neither the mother
nor the brother had friends in the city; and finally, we may suppose
that X put his mother on a train to another city far distant from his
own on the very day the action took place. Now X's brother cannot
be blamed for sharing with his mother a meal that he believed to be
wholesome: he was neither purposive, knowing, reckless, nor negligent in feeding her the poisoned eggs. But what shall we say about X?
We may assume that X was intensely (though quite properly and
non-Freudianly) fond of his mother; we may even trace part of X's
hostility toward his brother to their competition for her affection.
Under these quite reasonable suppositions we see that X is as free
from moral blame for the death of his mother as his brother is-if we
hold to the view that moral offenses are voluntary. X did not intend to
kill his mother any more than his brother did. X did not know that
his mother was in even the slightest danger of being killed. Far from
being negligent or reckless, he took the precaution of recalling that
he had put her on the train to another city and watched the train
pull out only a couple of hours before his brother arrived. X was not
purposive, knowing, reckless or negligent in so far as the poisoning
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of his mother was concerned. It makes no sense to say that killing his
mother was his voluntary act.
At this point we must be clear about two facts: first, we know that
X is guilty of crime in No. 17b; second, we know that he is morally
blameworthy in No. I7b. These facts are not in doubt. The problem
is: What are the essential characteristics of a theory of moral responsibility that can account for these facts?
In law and morals the problem has usually been solved on the basis
of a patently inappropriate application of the theory of voluntary responsibility. In this case, for instance, it may be said that X intentionally and voluntarily (with mens rea) served poisoned eggs to a
human being in order to kill him. On the basis of this voluntary
action-but by the use of a theory of status responsibility-X will be
held responsible for the consequences of his illegal and immoral voluntary act, even though these consequences run counter to X's intentions and desires. Sometimes, of course, the law limits the criminal's
responsibility to the foreseeable consequences of his act or to those
consequences which a reasonable man in his position would have foreseen. (The law is not particularly troubled by the fact that a reasonable man either would not be in the criminal's position or, if he were,
would no longer be reasonable.) But I feel sure that most lawyers,
jurymen, and moralists would hold X morally and criminally responsible for the extension of his action in No. 17b, despite the fact that X
did not intend what happened, nor could he nor any reasonable man
have foreseen these consequences. X would be blamed despite the
fact that it would be morally objectionable to blame him on the basis
of a reasonable and consistent application of the view that moral
6
offenses must be voluntary.
I firmly believe that X is responsible and blameworthy for wfiat
happened in No. 17. But the justification for holding X responsible
must be on grounds of his status or ontological responsibility. X, like
all persons, is dependent in action upon a matrix which may truncate,
fulfill, or extend his action in such a way that his action is concretized
in a way that may coincide with or be in disrelation to his plan or
intention. But the action-as it comes to be whether in or out of
accord with his intention and volition-is his action. There is no basis
for crediting him with his virtuous actions in perfect relation to his
intention unless his person and responsibility are enlarged to include
elements of the ontological matrix over which he has at best limited
control. Indeed, the ontological matrix is a part of his own person
46 In law one might apply the fiction of comparable intent; such a move is, of course,
patently inadequate. Legal fictions are simply ad hoc corrections to defective legal theories.
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no matter how narrowly he defines it. His volition is never independent of the limiting conditions of his intelligence, knowledge, imagination, emotionality, and energy. Limit the person to what is under
his voluntary control, and he disappears without trace along with his
volition. If we acknowledge a sufficient number of ontological conditions, over which X has no voluntary control, to account for the
existence of X and his capacity to act voluntarily, we have already
acknowledged to a significant degree his moral responsibility for what
he is no less than for what he does.
We extend this basic point only to a minor degree in recognizing
the moral blameworthiness of X for being the man who voluntarily
contributed to the situation in No. 13 that was transformed without
his knowledge, intention, recklessness or negligence-that is without
his voluntary participation-into the situation at No. 17b. In No. 17b
his voluntary act of killing his brother has been cut short prior to
fulfillment. But in No. 17b X has the being or status of a murderer.
He is the man who bears the volitional guilt of his brother's murder
without the ontological guilt, and he is the man who bears the onto4
logical guilt of his mother's death without the volitional guilt. "
I think the line of reasoning used by the court in Suvada v. White
Motor Company and related cases contains the elements of status responsibility infused with a trace of prior but not present voluntary
responsibility and mens rea that I have in mind. X created the risk
of poisoning someone other than his brother-however slight, nonnegligent and nonreckless that risk might be-in order to reap the
benefits of his brother's death, just as the defendants in Suvada built,
advertized, and sold for profit machinery which created an inadvertent
risk. X would have gladly accepted moral praise for the philanthropic
use of his brother's estate, had he inherited it; being rich would have
given him the ontological basis for certain moral virtues which might
be lacking without the estate. The defendants in Suvada may be well
respected for the philanthropy which rests on the ontological basis
of their risk-creating manufacturing and selling.
The consequences of X's action in No. 13 are outlined in No. 17.
X is responsible for No. 17. No. 17 describes his action, not because
of anything he did at No. 17 but because he is at No. 17 the man who
did what No. 13 describes. We find the person of X in No. 17 only
because in No. 17 he is the same man whose person was expressed in
47 By recognizing X's mixed responsibility, we can assess the full quality of his mother's
death, despite the fact that we lack the precise noun, adjective, or adverb to articulate
its quality. Her death was not quite a murder, but neither was it mere manslaughter;
certainly it was not accidental homicide.
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No. 13. Status responsibility rather than voluntary responsibility
justifies our blaming him for No. 17. But his status responsibility in
No. 17 derives from his mixed responsibility in No. 13.
Before considering a serious objection which Hart might raise to
this line of reasoning, let us consider the subtle responsibility of X's
brother in No. 17b. He is the man who gave the poison to his mother.
His position is like that of the mother who takes thalidomide as a
sleeping potion and gives birth to a deformed child, or of a man who
kills the child that suddenly runs in front of his car. In thinking of his
role in his mother's death, X's brother is not tortured as the thalidomide mother must be with the thought that she bought her ease at
the possible risk of harming her child. Nor is he troubled, as the unfortunate driver is, with the thought that by participating in a vehicular civilization and doing little or nothing to improve the safety
features of our streets or cars, he has run the risk of killing a child.
There are no antecedents to X's brother's action which contain any
traces of voluntary personal involvement-none that might have contributed to or colored his action in No. 17b. His volitional innocence,
and his good fortune perhaps, leave him in status innocence as well.
It is a precarious innocence, however, that could be compromised by
his having thought "What a disgusting old lady" just before he
handed her the eggs intended for himself.
C.
In offering my interpretation of the largely ontological basis rather
than the voluntary basis of X's responsibility in No. 17, I have been
troubled by an objection that Hart might reasonably raise. Suppose
we were to ask X if he could establish the conditions which on Hart's
view would excuse him from all moral blame in No. 17b. X could
certainly claim that No. 17b was completely unintentional insofar as
he was concerned. But could X claim that he had taken every possible
precaution? Would Hart say that there was one obvious precaution
X had deliberately ignored-namely, the precaution of leaving the
poison out of the eggs?
The objection looks formidable but its plausibility actually rests on
the details of No. 17 and not on the issues of responsibility. Suppose,
for instance, that X's brother had been Adolf Hitler and that No. 17b
took place in 1943. We might all agree that X was an unlucky hero,
like Colonel Staufenberg, but could we fail to blame him, at least in
some moderate degree, for his mother's death? When X takes upon
himself the status of an assassin, as in No. 13 (assuming that the
brother is Hitler), he establishes the ontological basis for his personal,
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moral involvement in what follows, even though it is not a voluntary
or intentional or negligent consequence of his action in No. 13, and
even though his action in 13-at the last moment it is to any degree
voluntary-is morally goodl
Perhaps the point can be seen with greater force if we consider
a continuum in which the agent's immediate action is not morally or
legally wrong or blameworthy. Following the conventional views of
contemporary Americans and Europeans, let us suppose a) that sexual
intercourse between consenting adults of the opposite sexes is not
morally offensive or blameworthy, and b) that it is morally offensive
and blameworthy to be the parent of a bastard child. If we take these
moral suppositions for granted, let us consider the following alternative situations in which-unless otherwise noted-Y is a healthy,
young, unmarried woman:
1. Y is raped and becomes pregnant.
2. Y is so seriously ill that advanced pregnancy would be fatal;
she takes every contraceptive precaution, but becomes pregnant.
3. Y has no idea what causes babies, has intercourse without being
aware of the possible consequences and becomes pregnant.
4. Y with full knowledge of the cause of pregnancy takes all contraceptive precautions, has intercourse, and becomes pregnant.
5. Y with full knowledge is negligent in the use of contraceptives
and becomes pregnant.
6. Y with full knowledge but in the ecstacy of love uses no contraceptive and becomes pregnant.
7. Y with full knowledge uses no contraceptive because of religious
scruples and becomes pregnant.
8. Y with full knowledge, complete self control, and no scruples
against contraceptive methods, does not use them and becomes
pregnant, not caring one way or the other.
This series is ordered on a continuum of undiminished or increasing
volition as we move from involuntary to clearly voluntary action
without extending the continuum to include any actions that involve the conscious intention to become pregnant.
Accordingly Y never intends to become pregnant, and in situations
No. 1 through No. 4 she is neither reckless nor negligent. Can she
not claim then that insofar as the first four situations are concerned,
her action is morally blameless because unintentional and that she
took every possible precaution.
Suppose Hart were to reply that she is confused about the action
which requires justification. She intentionally had intercourse in all
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but the first situation. But if she did not provoke the rapist, she is not
to blame for anything in No. 1. And since she took every precaution
to avoid becoming an unwed mother, she has done nothing wrong in
Nos. 2, 3, and 4, for there is nothing morally blameworthy, ex
hypothesi, about intercourse. At this point Y will have to say: "But
Professor Hart, I am pregnant. As things stand now I shall become
morally blameworthy for being the mother of a bastard child."
How is Hart to cope. with this situation on his theory of the voluntary character of moral offenses? The intercourse is not wrong, and on
the voluntary theory of action and responsibility there is no act of
becoming pregnant or of growing a baby. One does not become pregnant voluntarily or voluntarily develop a child in the womb. Hence,
on this theory, there is no way that one can be morally blameworthy
for becoming pregnant or producing a child except as a consequence
of voluntary intercourse. But since we hold that intercourse is not
wrong, we must then acknowledge the absence of any wrongdoing, if
pregnancy follows when all precautions have been taken. One cannot
admit that intercourse is morally right per se and then argue that in
order to take all precautions against pregnancy one must refrain from
intercourse. When one recognizes that intercourse is morally acceptable, he is committed on the voluntary theory to withholding moral
blame for pregnancy if all precautions short of sexual abstinence have
been taken. On Hart's theory we have the absurd consequence that
no moral blame can attach to having a baby out of wedlock provided
it was not planned and all precautions short of abstinence were observed.
The absurdity is even more glaring with regard to the moral blameworthiness of fathers who have children out of wedlock. Impregnating,
like being impregnated, may be a highly personal act. But it can be
so only on a view that takes seriously the notion of an organic mode of
personal action and organic intentionality. Procreation cannot even
be accomplished physically by the father; so far as he is concerned, it
is an act by proxy, and the proxy is a germ cell completely detached
from his body. If he has any effective intent in procreation beyond
intercourse, it is by means of the organic intention of his proxy. To
speak of his procreating voluntarily makes sense on an enlarged view
of voluntarism which absorbs a considerable portion of Bergsonian
organistic intention. But this Bergsonian view is not compatible with
Hart's metaphysical asceticism. On his view the man who has intercourse without intending to have a child and who sees to it that
proper contraception is used, must be free of all moral blame in
fathering a bastard child.
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Further evidence for the theory of responsibility I am urging is
that it does not fall into this absurdity with regard either to Y or her
male partner. On my view it is primarily the being of the father and
the mother, not their voluntary act of intercourse. that provides the
basis of their parental obligations and their blameworthiness for being
parents out of wedlock. Like X in No. 13 and No. 17b, the parent of
a bastard child is responsible for being the person who set in motion
factors that culminate in the development and birth of the child.
There is a far greater degree of personal involvement in this situation,
however, because of the organic expression of personality that is absent
in the example of the poisoned eggs. The personal agents of the
voluntary act of intercourse are present in procreation, not as chemical
or mechanical forces, but as the living, organically intentional, fertilized egg with their personal genetic structure.
Both fathers and mothers must recognize and accept their responsibility for what they are and for what they become as a consequence
of what they are, even when there is no bond created by intention or
negligence that unifies what they are with what they become by reference to what they do.
Action broadly defined is that which binds past to present to future;
it is the substance of personal duration. We destroy this bond or deny
its existence by accepting a narrow voluntaristic definition of action
and responsibility, and we lose the continuity of the moral self. Kant's
old problem of providing some basis for moral continuity in a self
which is unqualified in volition, except as it qualifies itself through
the voluntary action in every moment, will be our problem unless we
accept the necessary minimum of status elements in our concept of
moral obligation and responsibility.
The adherents of voluntary responsibility cannot evade these difficulties by holding that Y, after becoming pregnant, is responsible only
for doing whatever is necessary to avoid having the child out of wedlock; by holding, that is, that Y is excused from all moral blame if she
makes every effort either to have an abortion or get married. It would
be difficult to justify abortion in any but the first or second instances,
and even the first case poses some problems if one recognizes intrinsic
value in human life.48 Nor is the alternative of marriage universally
satisfactory: it may be impossible for Y to marry, or any possible marriage might be morally more objectionable than the offense of having
48 1 suppose it can be argued that the neglect and abuse to which a bastard child is
often subjected can be avoided by killing the child. The legitimacy of the argument might
be more apparent, however, if it were urged by the illegitimates. My experience is that
natural born bastards are just about as intent on living as self-made ones.
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the child out of wedlock. The father may have died; Y may conclude
after careful deliberation that the father or any man whom she could
marry would exert a morally corrupting influence on the child; or Y or
the father may conclude that to marry would be so destructive of career
to which an obligation is also owed that it is morally better to accept
the blame for having the child out of wedlock without compounding
moral offense by an immoral marriage. However we turn the problem around, there is no way of establishing the moral responsibility of
Y or her partner for the unintended consequences of their nonnegligent intercourse, without supplementing the voluntary theory
of responsibility by the introduction of status elements; yet there is
no way of denying their responsibility without abandoning our initial
premise that it is morally wrong to have a bastard child.49
But suppose we take the argument one step further. Let us drop
the supposition that it is wrong to be the parent of a bastard childa dubious supposition despite its conventional support-and hold instead merely that it is wrong to be voluntarily, recklessly, or
negligently the parent of a child for which reasonably adequate care
and provision has not and cannot be made. With this revision, what
shall we say of the expectant mother who has not been negligent or
reckless in the use of contraceptives and who was reasonably confident
of their adequacy. If moral offenses must be voluntary, she can be
morally responsible only for future voluntary acts-for example, the
neglect of her developing child. But our expectant mother may insist:
"Since I am not voluntarily (or morally) responsible for being pregnant, I refuse to alter my life because of this fact. And if I am blamed
because I refuse to care for myself or my child, those who blame me
must blame me in violation of Hart's principle that moral offenses
are essentially voluntary. Those who blame me must blame me for
refusing to meet a standard which, though appropriate to voluntarily
expectant mothers, is not appropriate to an involuntarily pregnant
woman like me. On the voluntary conception of moral responsibility,
I am no more obligated to care for my child than to care for a wart
on my nose."
I assume that we agree that this pregnant woman has an obligation
to care for the child she is carrying. But what reply can we make to
her statement? If the thesis that moral offenses must be voluntary is
sound, and if (having done her best to avoid pregnancy) she is not
49 The degree of Y's status responsibility in having a child out of wedlock will vary in
the situations from No. 5 to No. 8 according to the degree of voluntariness and the extent
of negligence or recklessness in the use of contraceptive devices. These further considerations are left to the reader.
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voluntarily pregnant, how can she be blamed morally for failing to
meet a standard appropriate to her actual status (which she tried to
avoid) but totally inappropriate to a nonpregnant status (which she
voluntarily but ineffectually chose). In terms of the status and conditions she voluntarily chose, she is not required to care for her developing child. But because of a change in her status-through no choice
or fault of her own-she is now obligated to care for it. She can claim,
on the basis of the voluntary thesis, that since she did not choose the
condition on which the new obligation is based, she does not choose
to violate that obligation. Admittedly, she chooses to act in violation
of the obligation to care for the child. But since she did not choose the
condition on which the obligation depends, she does not choose to
violate the obligation; hence, she violates no moral rule binding on
her under the voluntary thesis.
Here we confront an essential feature of moral obligation which
the voluntary thesis does not adequately account for-namely, moral
obligation may obtain whether or not it is chosen. Moral obligation
obtains according to the nature and the situations of persons. While
it is true that one's obligation may be changed by the degree to which
he has voluntarily altered his nature or his situation (through education, recklessness, or contract, for examples), moral obligation normatively regulates his action whether his nature and condition are within
his voluntary control or not.
In short, the context in which he is held to account for his voluntary actions (which are by no means purely voluntary but which, as
I have shown, contain status elements) is an involuntary, necessary
one. And if, in accordance with the voluntary thesis, one could excuse
himself from an offending action by showing that he could not help
it, it should be possible always to excuse oneself whenever he finds
that he is of a nature or in a situation contrary to his voluntary control. For one can say: "I cannot help being in this situation, and if I
were not in this situation, my offending conduct-even if voluntarywould not offend."
The fundamental basis of moral obligation is found in the nature
and situation of the agent. These status elements are preconditions
of the possibility of moral offense. And these preconditions are the
consequences of prior voluntary actions only in some but by no means
in all instances. The status elements, which define the agent's obligations, often arise without help from and despite the intentions of the
agent; and they can never result merely from his voluntary choice.
Hence, either we must abandon moral obligation as meaningless or
we must abandon the voluntary thesis. Accepting the latter alterna-
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tive, I hold (returning to our example) that the expectant mother is
liable to judgment by an involuntarily imposed standard because she
is in an involuntarily contracted condition of pregnancy. And I hold
that her offense, if she violates the duty to care for herself and her
baby, is not an essentially voluntary offense because it is defined by a
standard which is involuntarily imposed on the basis of her involuntarily established condition.
The foundation of moral obligation (and therefore of moral offense)
in status is fundamental. I may be privileged to argue that since I did
not choose my skin color, I will alter it; or that since I do not voluntarily have a crooked nose, I will have it bobbed. But I cannot argue
that since I did not choose my sex, I will have it changed; 50 or that
since I did not choose to become a father, I will refuse to support my
child. Either there are no moral obligations or moral obligations impose restrictions on my conduct because of my nature and my situation
even if neither is a product of my voluntary choice.
D.
Hart says, at the conclusion of the quotation we have been examining: "In morals 'I could not help it' is always an excuse, and moral
obligation would be altogether different from what it is if the moral
'ought' did not in this sense imply 'can.'" We have already seen the
confusion and artificiality involved in trying to show that "I could
not help it," and I have argued that there are many situations in
which "I could not help it" is not an excuse. Consequently, I have
argued that Hart's thesis of the voluntary character of moral offenses
itself distorts the meaning of moral obligation. But the question remains whether, in rejecting the claim that "I could not help it" as
always an excuse, we have transformed moral obligation into something altogether different from what it is.
Two things must be said. First, even if we radically change the view
of obligation defended by Hart, it does not follow that we shall alter
the character of moral obligation-we may merely articulate its nature
50 Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (denial of
application to change sex designation on birth certificate to correspond with results of
medical operation which changed petitioner's sex). See H. BENJAMiN, THE TRANSSEXUAL
PHENOMENON (1966) for a medical discussion and defense of the right to alter one's sex.
But Dr. Benjamin supports surgical transformation of sex in only very unusual situations
where there is a serious psychological disturbance in gender role and gender orientation.
See also Benjamin, ClinicalAspects of Transsexualism in the Male and Female, 18 Am. J.
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 458 (1964); and Benjamin, Nature and Management of Transsexualism:
with a Report on 31 Operated Cases, 72 "WEsTERN J. SURGERY, Owm'nucs & GYNECOLOGY

105 (1964).
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more precisely. This is not necessarily a logical issue about the meanings of words, despite the fact that Hart, and linguistic philosophers
generally, so regard it. Second, in any case I have not altogether transformed the character of moral obligation for I have tried to present
and defend the view that "I could not help it"-though not always an
excuse-would in many circumstances excuse one from the most
severe degree of moral blame. One is excused from the degree of
moral blame appropriate in cases of consciously voluntary wrongdoing
provided one can show that what he did was not fully voluntary. On
this point the traditional voluntaristic position on moral obligation is
not altered.
But I have also argued that the application of ethical rules and
principles in the absence of a theory of ethics containing: 1) a concept
of responsibility which provides for a continuum of increasing and
decreasing status and voluntary elements, and 2) a system of substantive
values to overcome the abstractness of formalism, will never sustain a
notion of moral obligation or responsibility adequate to account for
the subtle but extensive range of guilt and innocence, virtue and vice,
praise and blame in personal action. Without these factors no notion
of moral obligation or responsibility can be adequate to account for
the fundamental moral virtue of accepting one's being or the fundamental moral offense of refusing to do so. And it is important to note
that a part of the virtue of accepting one's being lies in the acceptance
of one's partial blameworthiness for what one is.
Theories like Hart's or Kant's, which restrict responsibility to voluntary conscious acts and limit moral offenses to consciously intended
or reckless acts in violation of principles or rules, can never give content or substance to moral action or to the moral person. Human choice
is not something isolated from the choosing person. Rather it is a
thoroughly organic mode of self-expression and self-discovery. There
are gradations of choice and degrees of voluntariness; at every instant,
however, even in those acts of purest, freest, most voluntary choice,
choice depends upon the being of the person and the matrix of his
action, both of which contribute to the moral quality of the person and
to the moral quality of his action even though neither is to any great
extent subject to his voluntary control. We shall never find a person
in his action unless his doing is his being, or at least a part of it. We
have neither understanding of man nor a basis for moral and legal
judgment of him, unless we recognize the human person as a unity of being and doing. This cannot be done without partially reshaping the
concepts of moral obligation and responsibility in order to free them of
the limitations of simplistic voluntarism. We must reshape the concept
of responsibility and the notions of intention, awareness, and choice
so that they apply in varying degrees over the entire range of personal
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existence. When this reshaping is done, we shall have a better understanding of moral obligation and moral and criminal responsibility.
The voluntary conception of moral obligation and responsibility appropriately characterizes maximally personal actions. But an adequate
conception must appropriately characterize all degrees and kinds of
personal action from the most voluntary to the least voluntary. For
this, a theory of responsibility is required in which there is a fusion of
status or ontological and voluntary elements, and in which moral obligation is understood as applying not merely to the volition but to the
being of each person.
Such a theory, when fully developed, will make necessary the reformulation of the judge's instructions to jurors in criminal cases.
Jurors will no longer be asked to say "Guilty" or "Not guilty." Rather
jurors will be asked to find from among four to eight clearly formulated
types of personal action, the type most nearly descriptive of the behavior of the accused. And on the basis of the jury's finding of the
being-and-doing of the accused, a revised criminal code will prescribe
punishment, treatment, or release. Throughout, however, a defendant
in a criminal case will enjoy full protection of legal counsel and the
procedural guarantees of the criminal law. For the recognition, in such
a theory, of an attenuated element of mens rea and actus reus in the
so-called status crimes of drug addiction and chronic alcoholism, etc.,
will preclude the withering away of the criminal law and the abandonment of those accused of such crimes to the less carefully controlled and
perhaps less just procedures of medical boards.
When this theory is fully developed, it will account for the moral
virtue of accepting one's being, and the moral blameworthiness of
one's refusal to do so. It will make clear, moreover, that part of the
virtue of accepting one's being lies in the acceptance of one's blameworthiness for what he is. We may even be able to understand the
doctrine of original sin ("In Adam's fall we sinned all") as well as
Oedipus' ultimate self condemnation expressed in Sophocles' play by
his act of blinding himself.

